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There are many markets where customers can combine multiple products to greater eﬀect,
or where customers can communicate with each other. In these cases compatibility of products
by diﬀerent vendors has a large eﬀect on the product market. Which choice ﬁrms make about
the compatibility of their products tends to depend on the wider context in which they make
this choice. Some vendors may be multi-product or multi-market forms. The implications that
(in)compatibility in one market may have for their other markets will aﬀect their compatibility
choice. A corollary of this argument is that a change in the multi-product or multi-market
scope of a ﬁrm will create a strategic shift in its preference for compatibility. Both mergers and
alliances may have the eﬀect of changing the relevant scope of products or product markets
that a ﬁrm serves. The event of such a merger or alliance will tend to change its compatibility
preference. This paper develops a model to explain the possible strategy shift of a merger or
alliance due to feedback between the various markets that a ﬁrm serves. It explores the
compatibility choices for digital videodisks that consumer electronics, computer, and media
companies experienced in the mid-1990s.
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An important aspect of several industries is the degree of compatibility between
products. 1 The choice of compatibility is important both for the suppliers and their
(potential) customers. Compatibility between products tends to enhance the utility of
a product for a user (more about the meaning of compatibility below). The ad-
vantages of compatibility for end users may increase the absolute size of market
demand. Indirect evidence for a user preference for compatibility is that products
with compatibility features tend to command a price premium (Gandal, 1995;
Harhoﬀ and Moch, 1997). Incompatibility on the other hand may reduce market
demand. The announcement of a new incompatible format for optical media, the
DIVX format, slowed demand for the newly established DVD format (Dranove and
Gandal, 2000). A disadvantage of compatibility from the suppliers perspective is
that it eliminates one source of diﬀerentiation between their products. While not
always true, a reduction of product diﬀerentiation is associated with more intense
price competition and lower proﬁts (Tirole, 1988, p. 295).
In many cases ﬁrms can choose whether they want their products to be com-
patible. There are several factors that inﬂuence their preferences for compatibility.
Two of these factors are the absolute size of the market demand created by a new
technology and the ﬁrms share of the associated revenues (Shapiro and Varian,
1999, p. 198). An incompatible technology, based on a proprietary standard, may
increase or safeguard the ﬁrms appropriation of revenues. Incompatibility may be
the price to pay if suppliers want to appropriate revenues from their technology
development eﬀorts. Compatible technologies, on the other hand may increase
overall market demand. An innovator may decide to give up control over its tech-
nology in order to trade-oﬀ its share of total revenues for the total size of revenues.
Firms may have to choose between either increasing overall market demand or
increasing their share of the revenues. A corollary of this insight is that ﬁrms with
diﬀerent sources of proﬁts can diﬀer in their preference for compatibility. Some
suppliers in a market may well be active in multiple product markets. The direct
eﬀects of the compatibility choice for a technology in one market may have indirect
consequences in other markets. As a result, the choice of compatibility may work out
diﬀerently for a pure player, a ﬁrm that is active only in one product market, than for
multi-market ﬁrms with interests in related markets. A pure player needs to recoup
its technology eﬀorts in the market directly aﬀected, so it tends to focus on the
appropriability of its investments. A multi-market ﬁrm can aﬀord to focus on
growing the market, knowing that it can recoup its investments in other markets that
are positively aﬀected by the growing market. When the market directly aﬀected by a
standard has spillovers on other markets, the market demand size motive when
choosing a standards regime may be more important than the appropriation motive.1 For academic studies of the compatibility choice, see the accessible textbook by Shapiro and Varian
(1999), and the surveys by Katz and Shapiro (1994), Matutes and Regibeau (1996), and Farrell and
Klemperer (2001).
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basic three-stage game theoretic model. The model explores the compatibility choice
in a context with two product markets that can be connected by either a multi-
market ﬁrm or an industry-wide alliance. It studies how a change in market scope
may cause a strategic shift in a ﬁrms compatibility choice. The interesting case of
incompatible digital video formats, and the ultimate adoption of a compromise in-
dustry standard, the DVD, illustrates the issues in a real world context. A concluding
section wraps up the paper.2. Factors that inﬂuence the compatibility choice
Compatibility is a characteristic of products that need to interact with other
products in order to create a performance for end users (Farrell and Saloner, 1986;
Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Matutes and Regibeau, 1996). Compatibility raises the level
and predictability of performance. If a product enables communication, such as a
telephone, diﬀerent products are called compatible if their users can communicate
with each other. All users who use diﬀerent, but compatible, products form a net-
work. The size of the network of users increases the utility of the service (more
people to communicate with), which represents a direct network externality (Katz
and Shapiro, 1985, 1986).
Individual products can be parts of a system of interconnected products. In this
context compatibility means that diﬀerent products complement each other, that is,
link to the same system. Users can mix any couple of complementary products (such
as hardware and software) if these are compatible with one another (Matutes and
Regibeau, 1988). Complementary systems can also lead to an indirect network ex-
ternality, that is, sales of either compatible product beneﬁt users of the other com-
patible product indirectly, by stimulating sales, investments, and improvements of
the complementary product. Another indirect externality occurs if interchangeability
of parts facilitates mass production when that leads to economies of scale (Farrell
and Saloner, 1986). In short, if products are compatible, they enable a positive
network externality to their users. Either directly or indirectly, compatibility makes it
possible for given resources to enable a better performance for the end users.
The extent to which products in a market are compatible has important eﬀects on
end users and their product demand. Compatibility is likely to beneﬁt the users (all
else remaining equal) by enabling positive network externalities. In a dynamic
context, however, the need for compatibility with established products (backward
compatibility) may hold back new innovations (Davis et al., 2001). As an alternative
to this excess inertia, there may also be excess momentum: consumers abandon
existing technology, fearing that it will not be compatible with a recently announced
innovation (Farrell and Saloner, 1986). Metcalfe and Miles (1994) distinguish be-
tween short-term and long-term eﬀects of compatibility. The short-term eﬀect of
compatibility is to create order and reduce variety. It reduces variety for producers
(fewer technologies to choose from) or consumers (by eliminating products that use
other technologies than the one that became the standard). Standardization also,
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Demand growth and large market size stimulate the development of compatible and
complementary products.
Compatibility between products tends to be a choice for their suppliers. The
compatibility choice they make may have large consequences for their performance.
A market leader may prefer its product to be incompatible with a weaker rival, to
prevent the latter from competing with it in more equal terms. From this argument
Economides and Flyer (1998) derive the counter-intuitive result that the more im-
portant the network externality is, the less likely that ﬁrms will prefer compatibility
between their products. When compatibility helps a ﬁrms rivals, it may help them
better compete with the focal ﬁrm, which may induce a ﬁrm from avoiding a
compatibility setting coalition. The more intense product market competition is, the
less likely that a ﬁrm will engage in a compatibility alliance with rivals (Bloch,
1995).
The eﬀects of incompatibility can be mitigated by using an adapter to connect
incompatible products. There are various kinds of adapter such as an interface,
emulator, converter or gateway. The choice of compatibility can be unilateral, if one
ﬁrm decides to build an adapter, or bilateral, if all suppliers have to accept the
adapter. If a ﬁrm can build an adapter unilaterally, it is likely to be the small ﬁrm in
a market (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). A small ﬁrm catches up on the greater network
of the market leader by using an adapter. The market leader is likely to try to reject
the adapter, as it prefers its weaker rivals to be incompatible. Creating an adapter
makes two products partially compatible, which shows that the compatibility choice
does not have to be a yes or no aﬀair (De Palma et al., 1999). If a new technology is
incompatible with the established technology, a converter between these technolo-
gies can both help and hurt the new technology (Choi, 1996a). The converter helps
the new technology to beneﬁt from the older technologys network, but it also
prolongs the useful life of the older technology, as it now has a converter to the new
technology.
Compatibility has various dynamic implications, which in turn inﬂuence the
choice of compatibility. The choice of compatibility inﬂuences the evolution of
prices. If their products are incompatible, each ﬁrm will try to generate the network
externalities mentioned above (such as economies of scale) by ﬁerce competition.
Firms are more willing to compete for customers today, if they believe that these
customers form a network (an installed base) that increases the utility of their
product for future customers. The associated price-cutting may make this scenario
more attractive to users than the case when ﬁrms agree up front on supplying
compatible products (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). Compatibility may prevent a crip-
pling price war ex ante (before a standard is established) to build up market share.
Once the products are introduced in the market, however, compatibility may facil-
itate customer switching between their product and their rivals products, thus in-
creasing price competition ex post.
In line with an evolutionary approach such as by Metcalfe and Miles (1994),
technological uncertainty tends to delay compatibility. By developing competing
technologies, ﬁrms can experiment and choose diﬀerent avenues of technological
Table 1
Factors that tend to increase (+) or decrease ()) the preference for compatibility
Factor Increase (+) or
decrease ())
compatibility
Literature
Network externality ) Economides and
Flyer (1998)
Intensity of product market competition reduces
incentives to collaborate on compatibility
) Bloch (1995)
Technological uncertainty calls for experimentation
by competition between incompatible technologies
) Choi (1996b)
R&D competition with uncertain outcomes tends
to create winners and losers. Winners prefer
incompatibility
) Farrell and Katz
(1998)
If speeding up technological progress is costly, ﬁrms
prefer compatibility, to slow down the race
+ Kristiansen (1998)
Price cutting to sell incompatible products reduces
proﬁts
+ Katz and Shapiro
(1986)
Using an adapter to connect an old technology to a
new incompatible technology delays the adoption
of the new technology
+ Choi (1996a)
A supplier of an old technology may use an adapter to
a new incompatible technology to survive the
introduction of the latter
) Katz and Shapiro
(1986)
The more time consuming a negotiation process, the
more attractive a hybrid standard setting process
) Farrell and Saloner
(1988)
A high customer preference for product variety
beneﬁts from standardization of technology and
components
+ Metcalfe and Miles
(1994)
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the technology to standardize on. An up-front decision to focus on compatibility
with a particular technology reduces the scope of this experimentation, and may be
harmful to customers in the longer term. An up-front decision for compatibility
reduces the incentives to do R&D in order to create an installed base. As a result of
lower levels of R&D, compatibility slows down technological progress (Kristiansen,
1998). If speeding up technological progress raises the required levels of R&D
strongly, the ﬁrms will prefer compatibility to slow down the technological race
between them. When ﬁrms compete in R&D, the uncertainties of R&D tend to lead
to winners and losers. The winner is subsequently likely to prefer incompatibility, in
order to avoid the loser to catch up (Farrell and Katz, 1998). Technological un-
certainty, therefore, tends to reduce compatibility.
The process needed to establish compatibility is costly, which is another reason
why incompatibility may occur. There are various ways to achieve compatibility.
One way is to formulate a standard, a speciﬁcation, such that products that satisfy
the speciﬁcation are compatible. A collective process to set a standard avoids in-
compatibility but may slow down the market introduction of an innovation. Farrell
and Saloner (1988) show that failure to reach an agreement in a collective process
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technology. They propose as the best approach a hybrid process, where ﬁrms engage
in collective standard setting, while introducing heir technology unilaterally if ne-
gotiations take too long. A hybrid standard setting process increases the speed of
market introduction, compared to a collective standard setting process. It also,
however, increases the risk that impatient suppliers introduce incompatible products
in the market. Table 1 summarizes this discussion about the factors that aﬀect the
compatibility choice.3. Spillover eﬀects and the compatibility choice
A factor not discussed above that may also aﬀect the compatibility choice is the
eﬀect of compatibility on the demand side of other product markets. Diﬀerent
product markets can be linked on the demand side or on the supply side. If products
are complementary, the demand levels of their respective markets are linked (Church
and Gandal, 1996; Matutes and Regibeau, 1989). A supply side link occurs when
there is an economy of scale or learning by doing eﬀect in an input that the pro-
duction processes for both markets share. This will lead to an economy of scope
(Baumol et al., 1982; Teece, 1980). A shared brand name or reputation can lead to an
(informational) economy of scope. It is also possible that one markets product is an
input in either the production process or consumption process in the other market.
The positions of these products in the value chains of suppliers and customers will
determine the potential for synergies among the markets.
A merger or alliance may change the scope of products over which a ﬁrm max-
imizes its proﬁts. This may cause a strategic shift. It changes the incentives the ﬁrm
has in competing within each of these product markets. In particular, it may change
the preference of the ﬁrm for the compatibility between products within one of its
product markets. This is an additional route through which an extension of a ﬁrms
product scope can change competition within individual product markets (Wegberg
and Witteloostuijn, 1992).
The eﬀect of multi-market scope on the compatibility choice may explain the stra-
tegic shift associated with a cross-market merger or alliance. A change in the ﬁrms
scope is positive or synergetic, if the ﬁrms overall proﬁt interests correlate positively
with market demand size in the focus market. If a ﬁrm has a synergistic expansion of
scope, it tends to prefer a collectively agreed compatibility standard.Without a positive
expansion of scope, a ﬁrm like a pure player will make the compatibility choice that
maximizes its value within themarket. It may prefer incompatibility in order to give up
some potential market demand size for higher revenues.4. A model of compatibility choice and multi-market scope
The model intends to explore the argument of the paper in a simple way, without
trying to be descriptively realistic. There is a focus market A. The products in market
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A to each user increases in the number of users of compatible technologies. The
suppliers play a three-stage game. They ﬁrst choose the scope of the product markets
to take into account in their compatibility choice. Next they choose whether to adopt
compatibility. Next, they compete in the product market.
There are two suppliers in market A, ﬁrms 1 and 2. They compete in prices pi
(Bertrand competition). Marginal costs are given and identical to c. Each ﬁrm sells
one unique product Ai with a given standalone quality level vi ði ¼ 1; 2Þ. The quality
levels are given and diﬀerent, with ﬁrm 1 having the high quality product: v1 > v2.
These quality diﬀerences are assumed to be unrelated to marginal costs. An example
where this tends to hold are information goods. Each ﬁrm realizes forthcoming
demand, which determines its output level qi. The ﬁxed costs are given and equal
between the ﬁrms at F. They include capital investments as well as research and
development. Each ﬁrm maximizes gross proﬁts, pi ¼ ðpi  cÞqi ði ¼ 1; 2Þ.
Each potential end user buys either zero units or one unit. There is a positive
direct network externality: the utility of the product increases in the number of fellow
users. A buyer (j) derives a net utility from one unit of product Ai ofUj ¼ ajvi þ bqi  pi: ð1Þ
The parameter aj indicates the importance of the standalone quality to an individual
user. The parameter b indicates the value of the network size (the network exter-
nality). The unit sales level of each individual product, qi, determines the size of the
network if the products are incompatible. If the products are compatible, they have
the same network, and the network size equals the total sales level in market A,
called Q. This changes net utility in the case of compatibility into
Uj ¼ ajvi þ bQ pi.
The consumer chooses the product that gives the largest net consumer surplus,
provided that it is positive, otherwise she chooses not to buy. The aj are uniformly
distributed over an interval ½amin; amax with a density of c, which implies that there
are cðamax  aminÞ potential buyers. The number of actual buyers equals the total
sales level, Q. Among the consumers with increasing as from amin to amax, there are
two critical consumers: the one who is indiﬀerent between buying product 2 (the low
quality product) and not buying (with a2), and the one who is indiﬀerent between
products 1 and 2 (with a1). Given these critical consumers (to be determined below),
the unit sales of products 1 and 2 in market A are:q1 ¼ c½amax  a1; q2 ¼ c½a1  a2; and
Q ¼ c½amax  a2; with amin6 a26 a16 amax: ð2ÞThere is another market, market B, whose product B is complementary to product A
in a speciﬁc sense: the utility of product B is higher for customers who bought a
product A than for those who did not. It does not matter here whether a customer
bought A1 or A2, nor does it matter whether A1 and A2 are compatible. The products
A and B are not compatible products, therefore, like computer hardware and soft-
ware. Instead, think of market A as computers and market B as for media with
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utility from reading about this market.
Market A opens up before market B, which means that both suppliers and cus-
tomers ﬁrst decide about buying and selling in market A, before they decide about
market B. Only buyers in market A are willing to buy product B. The buyers in
market B are homogeneous. Each individual buyer has a demand curve:
pB ¼ a bqB. The inverse market demand function in market B is:
pB ¼ a ðb=QÞqB, where Q is the number of buyers of product A. Market B is a
monopoly. The monopolists marginal production costs are zero. The market out-
comes are: qB ¼ aQ=2b; pB ¼ a=2; pB ¼ a2Q=4b; CS ¼ a2Q=8b, where CS is the total
consumer surplus. The consumer surplus per individual buyer, CSj, is a2=8b. By
deﬁning d ¼ a2=4b, the outcomes can be restated. The proﬁt level in market B is:pB ¼ dQ: ð3ÞConsumers are considered myopic, that is, when deciding about buying product A,
they do not anticipate on the consumer surplus they would realize later if they buy
product B. They are not sophisticated enough to understand the ramiﬁcations of
decisions in market A to market B.
The model is explored by three cases, each of which represents a ﬁrst stage choice
made by the ﬁrms. Case 1 explores two single-market suppliers in market A and a
third ﬁrm in market B. The single-market ﬁrms in market A may form an alliance to
set compatibility between their products. Case 2 explores one single-market ﬁrm in
market A, and one multi-market ﬁrm active in markets A and B. Case 3 explores an
industry-wide pre-competitive alliance of three single-market ﬁrms (two in market A
and one in market B) to choose compatibility. In each case, ﬁrms choose compati-
bility by comparing the outcomes when products in market A are compatible to
when they are not. This is the second stage of the game. Given the scope and the
compatibility choice, the ﬁrms in market A choose their prices. This is the third stage
of the game.
Call Qsc the total output level of market A in case s ð¼ 1; 2; 3Þ when products are
compatible, and Qsi, when they are incompatible. The diﬀerence that compatibility
makes in market A, is DQs ¼ Qsc  Qsi. The argument that compatibility increases
demand implies the prediction that DQs > 0 for all three cases. The relevant proﬁt
level may include proﬁts in market B, depending on the scope of the ﬁrms. The joint
compatibility bonus of the ﬁrms is the diﬀerence between total proﬁts when products
are compatible and total proﬁts when they are not. The proposition is that in cases 2
and 3 compatibility raises proﬁts (a positive compatibility bonus), while in case 1,
compatibility reduces proﬁts (a negative bonus).4.1. Case 1: compatibility choice by single-market vendors
Case 1 explores the compatibility choice when the suppliers in market A (ﬁrms 1
and 2) are independent from the supplier (ﬁrm 3) in market B.
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Given a choice for compatibility, case 1A explores pricing in the market. Con-
sumer utility for the consumer who is indiﬀerent between product 2 and not buying isa2v2 þ bQ1c  p2 ¼ 0: ð4Þ
The following equality identiﬁes the consumer who is indiﬀerent between products
1 and 2:a1v1 þ bQ1c  p1 ¼ a1v2 þ bQ1c  p2: ð5Þ
Together with Eq. (2), where Q1c ¼ c½amax  a2, his gives three equations in a1, a2,
and Q1c, that can be solved to give:a1 ¼ ðp1  p2Þ=ðv1  v2Þ;
a2 ¼ ðp2  bcamaxÞ=ðv2  bcÞ; ð6Þ
Q1c ¼ c½ðamaxv2  p2Þ=ðv2  bcÞ:
The thresholds a1 and a2 are constrained to lie in the interval ½amin; amax. A positive
value for a2 requires an assumption:
4.1.1.1. Assumption. bc < v2. Substitute Eq. (6) in Eq. (2) to get the demand levels qi.
Given these price and sales levels, ﬁrms have the following levels of gross proﬁts:p1 ¼ ðp1  cÞc½amax  ðp1  p2Þ=ðv1  v2Þ;
p2 ¼ ðp2  cÞc½ðp1  p2Þ=ðv1  v2Þ  ðp2  bcamaxÞ=ðv2  bcÞ:
ð7ÞEach ﬁrm chooses its price to optimize its gross proﬁts, given the price of its rival.
Applying this to the gross proﬁts in Eq. (7) determines the equilibrium prices as:p1 ¼ ð3cðv1  bcÞ þ ð2v1  bcÞðv1  v2ÞamaxÞ=ð4v1  v2  3bcÞ;
p2 ¼ ðcð2v1 þ v2  3bcÞ þ ðv2 þ bcÞðv1  v2ÞamaxÞ=ð4v1  v2  3bcÞ:
ð8ÞSubstitute the proﬁt maximizing price levels in the demand levels to get the level of
sales and proﬁts, including the sum total proﬁt level of ﬁrms 1 and 2, p1c:q1 ¼ cðc 2v1amax þ amaxbcÞ=ð4v1 þ v2 þ 3bcÞ;
q2 ¼ ðcðv1  bcÞðamaxðv2 þ bcÞ  2cÞÞ=ððbc v2Þðv2 þ 3bc 4v1ÞÞ;
p1 ¼ ðv1  v2Þcðc ð2v1  bcÞamaxÞ2=ðv2 þ 3bc 4v1Þ2;
p2 ¼ ðv1  v2Þcðv1  bcÞð2cþ amaxðv2 þ bcÞÞ2
=ððv2  bcÞðv2 þ 3bc 4v1Þ2Þ:
ð9ÞThese outcomes determine the total proﬁts, p1c, and total output level, Q1c, realized
when the products of the single-market suppliers in market A are compatible.
4.1.2. Case 1B: incompatible products
Case 1B explores pricing when the suppliers in market A are single-market ﬁrms,
and they have chosen their products to be incompatible. With incompatible product
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qi. The consumer identiﬁed by a2 is indiﬀerent between product 2 and not buying:a2v2 þ bq2  p2 ¼ 0: ð10Þ
The consumer identiﬁed by a1 is indiﬀerent between products 1 and 2:Uj ¼ a1v1 þ bq1  p1 ¼ a1v2 þ bq2  p2: ð11Þ
With the expressions q1 ¼ c½amax  a1 and q2 ¼ c½a1  a2 in Eq. (2), this gives four
expressions in four variables ða1; a2; q1; q2Þ. For ease of presentation, we deﬁne
C ¼ v1v2  v22  v1bc v2bcþ b2c2. Solve the four equations to give:a1 ¼  1C ðp2v2 þ ðamaxbc p1Þðv2  bcÞÞ;
a2 ¼  1C ðp2ðv1 þ v2 þ bcÞ þ bcðp1  amaxbcÞÞ;
q1 ¼ cC ðv2ðp1  p2  ðv1  v2ÞamaxÞ þ ðp1  v1amaxÞbcÞ;
q2 ¼ cC ðp2v1 þ p1v2 þ ðp2  v2amaxÞbcÞ:
ð12ÞThis gives demand levels written as functions of the prices. Anticipating consumers
demand levels, the ﬁrms choose their price levels to maximize their gross proﬁts.
Given the proﬁt functions, the ﬁrst order conditions of optimality can be derived.
Reformulated, these conditions are the reaction curves of the prices. Together, they
determine the proﬁt maximizing prices:p1 ¼ 1
2
cð þ v1amax þ v2
4Cþ 3v22
ðcð2v1 þ v2  2bcÞ þ v2amaxð  3v1 þ 2bcÞÞÞ;
ð13Þ
p2 ¼ 1
2
cð þ v2amax þ v2
4Cþ 3v22
ð  v2ð  3cþ ð2v1 þ v2ÞamaxÞ þ 2ðv1amax  cÞbcÞÞ:The second order conditions for optimality hold when, as in the previous case 1A,
v1 > v2 and v2  bc > 0, as well as when c > 0. These prices lead to tedious ex-
pressions for the output and proﬁt levels:p1 ¼ cðv2  bcÞ
Cð4Cþ 3v22Þ2
ððv1  v2Þv2ðcþ 2v1amaxÞ þ ðcð2v1 þ v2Þ
þ ð2v21  2v1v2 þ v22ÞamaxÞbc 2ðc v1amaxÞb2c2Þ2;
p2 ¼ cðv1  bcÞ
Cð4Cþ 3v22Þ2
ððv1  v2Þv2ð2c v2amaxÞ  ðcð2v1 þ v2Þ
 v2ðv1 þ 2v2ÞamaxÞbcþ 2ðc v2amaxÞb2c2Þ2; ð14Þ
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ððv1  v2Þv2ðcþ 2v1amaxÞ þ ðcð2v1 þ v2Þ
þ ð2v21  2v1v2 þ v22ÞamaxÞbc 2ðc v1amaxÞb2c2Þ;q2 ¼ cðv1  bcÞCð4Cþ 3v22Þ
ððv1  v2Þv2ð2c v2amaxÞ  ðcð2v1 þ v2Þ
 v2ðv1 þ 2v2ÞamaxÞbcþ 2ðc v2amaxÞb2c2Þ:
Summing up these output and proﬁt levels gives the total output level, Q1i, and the
total proﬁt level, p1i, for the case where the single-market ﬁrms in market A choose
their products to be incompatible.4.2. Single-market ﬁrms and compatibility choice
The comparison between cases 1A and 1B reveals the incentives that single-
market ﬁrms have for compatibility. Rather than introducing complicated bar-
gaining procedures between ﬁrms, the model assumes that ﬁrms prefer the outcome
that oﬀers the largest total proﬁts. The Coase theorem (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992)
suggests that ﬁrms bargain to an eﬃcient (for them) outcome. How they do that is
left outside of this model. It is possible that ﬁrms exchange side payments, that is,
when going from compatible to incompatible products, if one ﬁrm would gain and
the other would lose, the one that gains compensates the one that loses. Side pay-
ments can be made during compatibility bargaining, if ﬁrms also need to settle li-
cense fees among themselves for the technologies that together constitute the
technology they standardize on. The DVD bargaining process to be discussed further
on saw examples of this.
The joint compatibility bonus is the diﬀerence, p1c  p1i, between total proﬁts in
market A when products are compatible and total proﬁts when they are not. An
analytical solution from comparing the total proﬁt levels in these two cases is hard to
interpret (and lengthy to reproduce). An obvious analytical result is when b ¼ 0,
when there is no network eﬀect (see the utility function (1)): the proﬁts and sales
when products are compatible equal those of incompatible products.
Additional insights come from a numerical solution. The numerical solution as-
sumes that amin ¼ 0, amax ¼ 1:5, c ¼ 1, and v2 ¼ 0:2. For values of b in the interval
½0:01; 0:05 and v1 in the interval ½0:4; 1, the second order conditions for optimality
and the other assumptions hold (bc < v2 < v1; 0 < C). The sales bonus is positive:
compatibility increases sales for all levels of b and v1 simulated. By increasing the
network of each product (from its own sales to total industry sales), compatibility
increases consumer utility. Consumers who would not buy a product before, now
enter market A. For low levels of the marginal cost (about less than 0.08), com-
patibility increases total proﬁts in market A. For higher levels of marginal cost
(about 0.12 or higher), compatibility decreases total proﬁts (for all values of b and v1
simulated). Compatibility enhances the quality of products with the same network
beneﬁt. This makes the products better substitutes for each other. The result is more
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prices can still oﬀer proﬁts, hence compatibility is more proﬁtable than incompati-
bility. For high levels of marginal costs, the low prices due to compatibility reduce
proﬁts; hence incompatibility is more proﬁtable. The interesting case for this paper is
when single-market ﬁrms will prefer incompatible products. Hence, we assume
henceforth relatively high marginal costs (c ¼ 0:3).
4.3. Case 2: compatibility choice with a multi-market supplier
The second case is where the low quality ﬁrm in market A, ﬁrm 2, acquires or
merges with ﬁrm 3 in market B. This may change the preferences for compatibility of
their products in market A. When the products in market A are compatible, the
situation is similar to the case 1A up to the proﬁt functions in Eq. (8). Firm 2 in-
cludes in its overall proﬁts its proﬁts in market B (Eq. (3)): p2 ¼ ðp2  cÞq2 þ dQ. The
second part of the right hand side reﬂects the fact that for each customer in market
A, ﬁrm 2 earns an additional proﬁt of d in market B. The two suppliers in market A
will prefer compatibility if this raises their total proﬁts, which amount top2c;i ¼ ðp1  cÞq1 þ ðp2  cÞq2 þ dðq1 þ q2Þ ð15Þ
Given the choice about compatibility, the ﬁrms take their product market deci-
sions in a similar way as in case 1A or 1B. The equations are unreported here to
avoid undue repetition of diﬀerent, but similar, results. A numerical solution with
amin ¼ 0, amax ¼ 1:5, c ¼ 1, v1 ¼ 0:4, and v2 ¼ 0:2, shows that for values of b in the
interval ½0:01; 0:05 and d in the interval ½0; 1, compatibility increases sales in market
A.
The compatibility choice depends on how market B proﬁtability, the factor d,
inﬂuences the joint compatibility bonus, the relative proﬁtability of compatible
products. As Fig. 1 shows, d tends to increase the compatibility bonus. For large
enough d, the compatibility bonus is positive.
For cases with high enough d, the ﬁrms prefer compatibility in case 2 in cases
where they would prefer incompatibility in case 1 (the situation of case 1 is akin to
the situation d ¼ 0 in Fig. 1). Multi-market ﬁrms tend to favour compatibility over
incompatibility, because they include in their considerations the feedback eﬀect of
sales in market A on sales in market B. One consequence of this result is that a multi-
market merger between ﬁrms 2 and 3 induces ﬁrms 1 and 2 to establish a standard
setting alliance in market A: the merger and alliance are complementary.
4.4. Case 3: Compatibility choice by an industry-wide alliance
In case 2, the merger or acquisition between ﬁrms 2 (in market A) and 3 (in
market B) has the synergy eﬀect that decision making in market A explicitly takes
into account the eﬀect on market B. A multi-market alliance between ﬁrms 1, 2 and 3
would have a similar eﬀect. Firms 1 and 2 may choose compatibility if they take into
account that this enhances proﬁts in market B, even though it decreases them in
market A (as case 1 showed). The alliance focuses on total proﬁts in markets A and
Fig. 1. Eﬀects of network eﬀect (b) and demand spillover (d) on compatibility bonus.
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proﬁts in markets A plus B taken together, there is a rationale for them to prefer
compatibility. Firm 3 should, however, compensate for the loss of proﬁts in market
A. It can do that by sharing in the ﬁxed costs of developing the technology in market
A, or by licensing technology from the vendors in market A.
An alliance will not be permitted to adjust prices in market A to raise demand in
market B: that would be a cartel. An industry-wide alliance that combines ﬁrms 1, 2
and 3 will exist only in the stage of the game where ﬁrms decide about compatibility.
Once compatibility has been decided upon, the decision making by the ﬁrms in the
two product markets is the same as in case 1, where each ﬁrm in each market decides
for itself. Their interaction is the same as in case 1, except that this time the criterion
to choose compatibility is that total proﬁts in market A plus B need to exceed proﬁts
when the products in market A are incompatible. The ﬁrms may therefore
choose compatibility in situations where they would prefer incompatibility in case 1.
See Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 shows that the compatibility bonus can be both positive and negative, like
in case 1. The outcome when d is zero is equal to the one of case 1. Higher values of d
raise the compatibility bonus. For a large enough proﬁtability of market B (d), the
compatibility bonus is positive. In these cases the three-ﬁrm alliance will choose
compatibility when the ﬁrms 1 and 2 acting together in market A would not.
Fig. 3 shows the diﬀerence between the aggregate proﬁts when three ﬁrms form an
industry-wide alliance (case 3) versus when ﬁrms 2 and 3 merge (case 2).
Fig. 3 shows that the aggregate proﬁts under an alliance are less than with a
merger. While both the merger and the industry-wide alliance choose compatibility
to maximize joint proﬁts (Eq. (15)), given a choice for (in)compatibility, a merger
leads to higher proﬁts as it enables ﬁrm 2 to coordinate its pricing in market A with
Fig. 3. Total proﬁts of an industry-wide alliance minus those of a multi-market merger.
Fig. 2. The compatibility bonus from the perspective of a three-ﬁrm alliance.
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industry-wide alliance.5. Intuition of the results
Compatibility is a double-edged sword for the suppliers of market A: it raises
consumer utility (the network externality eﬀect) and thus the demand level, but also
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leads, given Bertrand price competition, to lower prices and proﬁts for the suppliers.
The lower prices in market A may, however, have a redeeming advantage if they
stimulate demand in the related market B. The single-market suppliers in market A
will, however, ignore this spillover eﬀect.
There are two ways to convince the suppliers in market A to take this spillover
eﬀect into account. Firstly, the supplier in market B may merge with a supplier in
market A. The combined ﬁrm is willing to accept lower prices in market A, due to
compatibility, when this stimulates demand and proﬁtability in market B. Sec-
ondly, an industry-wide alliance may help the supplier in market B to convince the
suppliers in market A to accept compatibility. The gain for the supplier in market
B is obvious. It will need side payments to the suppliers in market A to compensate
them for their loss of proﬁts. Mechanisms for this may be that the supplier of
market B makes a predominantly ﬁnancial contribution to the industry-wide alli-
ances, while the suppliers of market A contribute in kind with their technological
know how. The model indicates that a cross-market merger increases total industry
proﬁts compared to an industry-wide alliance. The merger creates a multi-market
ﬁrm that lowers prices in market A in order to stimulate sales in market B. A
pro-competitive compatibility alliance has no such ability and is, therefore, less
proﬁtable.6. A case study
The DVD format is an important standard that has become a major revenue
source for ﬁlm companies. The DVD case has attracted quite some academic interest
(Dranove and Gandal, 2000; Lint and Pennings, 2003; Vercoulen and Wegberg,
1998). Other sources of information for this case are the business journals Business
Week, The Economist, and the Wall Street Journal, the Dutch IT journal Auto-
matisering Gids, and the websites of the DVD Forum 2 and the electronics news site
C:Net. 3
The two companies that successfully introduced the CD media format in the
1980s, Philips and Sony, came out of this struggle with a lesson learned. By acquiring
media interests they could leverage their power over media in the struggle to es-
tablish a new media format. In the late 1980s the three major consumer electronics
companies Matsushita, Sony and Philips acquired ﬁlm and music companies. They
intended to use these interests to strong-arm the media industry in accepting a
successor format to the CD: the format we now call the DVD. Table 2 shows the
moves these three consumer electronics companies made.
Table 2 shows that Philips pioneered the strategy of integrating hardware and
media businesses in one multi-market company. In the 1980s Philips acquired the2 http://www.dvdforum.org/forum.shtml.
3 http://www.news.com/?cnet.tkr.
Table 2
Moves by consumer hardware ﬁrms in the media industry
Year Company Move Partners Industry
1962 Philips Joint venture Siemens; result is Polygram Music
1987 Philips Acquisition Polygram Music
1988 Sony Acquisition CBS Records Music
1989 Sony Acquisition Columbia Pictures Film
1990 Matsushita Acquisition MCA Universal Film
1995 Matsushita Divestment MCA Universal, to Seagram Film
1998 Philips Divestment Polygram, to Seagram Music; ﬁlm
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and Matsushita followed suit. In the 1990s, however, Matsushita was the ﬁrst to shed
its media interest. Philips followed this move. Only Sony hangs on to the multi-
market hardware/media scope. The pivotal event during the 1990s that triggered this
development was the DVD standards battle (see Table 3).
Philips and Sony were well established in the media industry by the time they
started their high density MMCD format group with the American company 3M.
They had, in common with the result in cases 2 and 3 of the model above, preferred
multi-market mergers to industry-wide alliances as a tool to establish a video disk
format. In the following year of 1995, Toshiba announced a diﬀerent, incompatible
format, the Super Density disk. Toshiba did not have media interests of its own. It
was successful nevertheless, by forming an alliance with media companies. Moreover,Table 3
The DVD standards struggle
Year Event Partners
1994 High density Multimedia CD (MMCD) Philips, Sony, 3M
1995 Super Density (SD) Disk Toshiba, Pioneer, Thomson, Mats-
ushita
Expansion of Super Density group Time Warner, Hitachi, JVC, Sam-
sung, Mitsubishi, MGM/United Ar-
tists, MCA
Expansion of MMCD group Mitsumi, Teac, Ricoh, Alps, Acer
Peripherals
Hollywood Digital Advisory group Hollywood ﬁlm producers want to be
involved in standardization
Joint statement calling for a single standard for
DVD
Apple, Compaq, HP, IBM, Microsoft
DVD Forum is formed, a consortium to merge
the MMCD and SD alliances
Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Pio-
neer, Philips, Sony, Thomson, Time
Warner, Toshiba, Victor
1997 DVD Forum becomes an open membership
organization for digital optimal media stan-
dardization
DVD Forum (with more than 230
members as of Aug. 2003)
Announcement of the DIVX format,
(partially) incompatible with DVD
Circuit City
1999 DIVX support withdrawn from the market Circuit City
M. van Wegberg / Information Economics and Policy 16 (2004) 235–254 251its partner Matsushita brought with it its own media business, MCA. Lint and
Pennings (2003) argue that Matsushita supported Toshiba as a deliberate ploy to
delay the arrival of an industry standard for digital video, in order to protect its cash
cow of the analog VHS videocassettes. Be that as it may, the integration of media
businesses in the digital video standards battle helped to establish industry-wide
compatibility around the DVD moniker.
The process of hammering out a compromise standard included the issue of how
to divide the licensing revenues among the companies that got their technologies
included in the compromise. It took a large part of 1995 to establish a licensing
revenue sharing strategy. While bargaining may not have aﬀected the preference for
compatibility itself (as the model above assumed), it did put a pressure on the
timetable of introducing the DVD.
This development revealed three weaknesses of the media acquisition strategies of
the three majors. First, it might not help them when competing with each other.
Secondly, a cross-industry alliance may do just as well in bringing media interests on
board as a multi-market merger would. Toshiba clearly showed this: it had no media
business of its own, but it was able to attract powerful media allies. In the absence of
support from various media and consumer electronics ﬁrms, however, a new format
cannot succeed. In the late 1990s the DIVX format came up as an incompatible
alternative to the DVD (Dranove and Gandal, 2000). The rise and fall of the DIVX
format demonstrated that lack of signiﬁcant industry support could fatally hurt a
formats adoption. Thirdly, acquiring media interests caused a strategic shift in the
consumer electronics companies. The original plan appears to have been to use
media interests to strengthen ones hand in the competition between incompatible
new media formats. However, once media interests became part of the three con-
sumer electronics majors, their interests shifted. The importance of the market
adopting ones own format diminished. Instead, the importance increased of the
media industry as a whole adopting a new standard.
The strategic shift induced by the acquisition strategies caused tensions within
the consumer electronics conglomerates. Hardware divisions beneﬁt the more their
technology is included in a standard, because that is a basis for licensing revenues.
A compromise standard that includes technologies from many other ﬁrms may hurt
rather than help their cause. The media businesses, on the other hand, are mainly
interested in having a standard. They may also have other interests in which kind of
technologies are included in a standard. As a consequence, rifts revealed themselves
within these conglomerates between the hardware and media businesses. The
compatibility choice is only one such dividing factor. Illegal copying of music and
ﬁlm DVDs also divides the hardware and media businesses of Sony (C:net, 16 June
2002). Matsushita solved the associated problems by keeping MCA at a distance,
which however defeated the purpose of acquiring MCA (Wall Street Journal
Europe, 18-11-94).
This case illustrates that acquiring interests in a market with demand spillovers
may change the strategy of a ﬁrm. It may increase its preference for compatibility, in
order to beneﬁt from positive spillovers on demand in the related markets. The ﬁrm
may accept the strategic shift, and adjust its compatibility strategy accordingly. This
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develop a compromise speciﬁcation, the DVD. An alliance may also lead to such a
strategic shift.
The model above points to the advantage of a merger above an alliance: a multi-
market merger enables a ﬁrm to adjust prices, which also helps in exploiting spill-
overs between markets. Sony may well be an example of this cross-subsidization.
Sonys large media interests are increasingly important as a source of proﬁts. For
example, in the ﬁscal year 2002, Sony lost $62 million on its electronics sales, while it
gained $152 million in its music business (C:net, 16 June 2002). Partly, these results
may indicate the multi-market ﬁrms strategy of case 2 above: reduce prices in the
hardware industry, so as to increase revenues in the media industry. Neither Philips
nor Matsushita went this way. Philips media business was too small to develop
market power in the media market. Matsushita did not integrate the decision making
of its hardware and media businesses enough to adapt its pricing strategies. Both
companies may have learned that ad hoc alliances with media companies can be a
better way to coordinate a compatibility choice.7. Conclusion
The focus of this paper has been the strategic shift that when ﬁrms expand their
product scope, this changes their preferences for compatibility of products in any
particular product market. In the speciﬁc case explored here, the multi-market ﬁrm
has a greater preference for compatibility than single-market vendors (pure players).
The scope enhancing mergers in Information and Communication Technologies and
e-commerce may thus increase the ﬁrms preferences for compatibility and open
standards. Since multi-market ﬁrms have diﬀerent preferences with regard to stan-
dards than do single-market ﬁrms, ﬁrms may merge in our model, in order to change
their preferences. A change in scope, either by a merger or by an alliance, causes a
strategic shift with respect to compatibility choices. A cross-market merger may
increase a preference for compatibility, which in turn may stimulate industry-wide
alliances to adopt a compatibility standard. This indicates that in our model, at least,
mergers and alliances are complementary rather than substitutes.
The analysis of the strategic shift may help understand the strategic upheavals of
the three leading consumer electronics companies Matsushita, Sony, and Philips
during the 1990s. They acquired media businesses to strengthen their hardware
businesses that were involved in format wars that called for compatibility choices. As
our model explains, the integration of media businesses changed their strategic
thrusts with respect to the compatibility choice. Rather than pushing ones own in-
compatible format (as a single-market hardware ﬁrm would), the newly emerged
conglomerates went for compatibility, even if this entailed signiﬁcant compromises.
Matsushita and Philips concluded from the emerging strategic shift that media caused
too many conﬂicts within their organization. Sony instead ﬁghts on in order to ex-
plore the strategic potential that comes from being a multi-market conglomerate.
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paper. Extensions are possible by explicitly analysing the bargaining process for
compatibility, coalition formation choices, and the strategic use of pre-emptive
moves in acquisition and compatibility games.References
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